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     1. Introduction 
In most countries, the central government has considerable policy discretion in the allocation 
of infrastructure investment across regions. For example, it is by far easier to reallocate road 
funds from one region to another than to perform this redistribution by means of public 
employment or consumption. Redistribution of infrastructure investments from one region to 
another can not be considered as random: they obey both to economic and political 
motivations. The purpose of this paper is to analyze these motivations, asking questions like: 
is infrastructure investment directed to the regions with higher project’s impact, following 
thus an efficiency criterion?; or, otherwise, is redistribution the main criterion guiding the 
regional allocation of infrastructure investment, being funds devoted to regions with low 
output levels? Of course, there is also the possibility that none of these objectives coincide 
with government’s purposes, and that these are based on pure political interest. Following this 
intuition, we may therefore ask: which are these political drivers and which is its influence on 
observed infrastructure investment allocations? 
We try to answer these questions by estimating an equation that picks up the main determi-
nants of the allocation of infrastructure investment among the Spanish regions. The estimated 
investment equation is theoretically derived from a very general specification of central’s 
government objective function, which accounts both for the equity-efficiency trade-off and 
for deviations from this rule arising from political factors. The equation is estimated with a 
panel of data on investment and capital stock of transportation infrastructure (i.e., roads, 
railroads, ports and airports) for the Spanish departments (NUTS3) during the period 1987-96. 
We selected transportation infrastructures for two reasons. First, they are the most relevant 
infrastructure category in Spain, accounting for nearly 70% of total productive infrastructure 
investment (Ministerio de Fomento, 2001). Second, these are the infrastructures that show a 
major impact on output in production function analyses with Spanish data (see, e.g., Mas et 
al., 1996)1. Casual observation also shows that most demands of infrastructure improvements 
by regional business groups focus on transportation projects. We feel that evidence on the 
                                                           
1Other sizeable productive infrastructure categories, as water projects and urban infrastructures (nearly 
25%; Ministerio de Fomento, 2001) do not show any effect on output in empirical analyses. Also we 
do not consider the effect of investments in the so-called social infrastructures (e.g., health, education 
and so on) first because they use not to be included among productive infrastructures, but also mainly 
because investment in these categories is less easily diverted from one region to the other and, 
actually, investments in these categories are the full responsibility of regional governments. 
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Spanish experience will be of interest across Europe, also for various reasons. First, up to our 
knowledge this is one of the first papers analysing this topic with data corresponding to an 
European country.The paper by Cadot et al. (1999), performing a similar analysis in the case 
of the French regions, is the main exception to this rule. Second, as part of infrastructure 
projects in Spain are financed by European funds, it is of wide European interest to know 
which are the criteria explaining the regional allocation of infrastructure investment.  
The paper is related to the literature analyzing the determinants of public investment. Among 
these papers we could cite the works of Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1989, 1993) and Petchey et 
al. (2000). But both papers focus on investment spending decisions made by subnational 
governments. Papers analyzing central government’s expenditure allocation across 
jurisdictions are less common. Among these papers we should include some works that try to 
quantify the efficiency-equity trade-off implicit in the territorial distribution of public services 
(see, e.g., Behrman and Craig, 1987, and Craig and Heikkila, 1989), or other recent papers 
that focus on political motivations driving the territorial distribution of intergovernmental 
grants and other public programs (e.g., Levitt and Snyder, 1995, Cadot et al., 1999, Case, 
2001, Dahlberg and Johansson, 1999 and Johansson, 2001). However, as we told before, only 
the paper by Cadot et al. (1999) is specifically centered on infrastructure investment 
allocation. In the Spanish case, some empirical papers have previously analyzed the rules 
implicit in the territorial distribution of public investment (De la Fuente, 1999 and 2001, and 
Bosch and Espasa, 1999)2. These papers do not account for the role of political factors, which 
have been previously considered by Boix (1995) and De la Fuente and Vives (1995)3. The 
main difference between this literature and our work is that the investment allocation equation 
we use is theoretically derived. This specification allows us to take into account the equity-
efficiency trade-off accounting at the same time for political influences.  
In our case, and with the only purpose of guiding the specification of the equation explaining 
the territorial distribution of infrastructure investment, we model the behavior of the 
government as having a well-defined objective function with output levels of all regions 
                                                           
2 There are also some papers analyzing the expenditure made by Spanish regional governments. See 
e.g., Castells and Solé (2000) for an analysis of spending in different infrastructure categories, and 
Lago (2001) for a paper focusing on total regional investment. 
3 The first author reach the conclusion that they were quite important during the eighties but the other 
paper (focusing specifically on infrastructure allocation) conclude that they are not relevant. 
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appearing as arguments. Our approach can be considered an extension of Behrman and Craig 
(1987) to the case of productive public investment. Another difference with this paper is the 
inclusion of political factors in the equation. As we said before, our work shares also some 
similarities with the paper of Cadot et al. (1999) analyzing the regional distribution of 
infrastructure spending in France. However, these authors focus on lobbying efforts by 
business groups as the main channel of political influence of the different regions, while we 
center mainly on electoral considerations (e.g., central government incumbent’s marginal 
probability of gaining/loosing a departmental representative in the national legislature).  
The paper is also related to the vast literature on the effects of infrastructures on output arising 
from Aschauer’s seminal papers (1989a and 1989b). First, although this is not our purpose 
here, the results showing that investment allocation responds to changes in the regional eco-
nomies suggest that politicians act “as if” infrastructures have economic effects. Moreover, as 
our equation is derived from a model explicitly including a production function, the estimates 
may indeed be interpreted as an indirect test on the effect of infrastructures. We believe that 
our approach, which consists on looking at the determinants of investment instead than at the 
effects of infrastructures on the economy, we will get a new perspective on this topic. Second, 
our results suggest that infrastructure growth depends on output growth and other exogenous 
variables (e.g., political factors). This ultimately means that infrastructure capital should be 
considered as endogenous in production function estimation. Our results will help in the 
selection of instruments to be used in these studies.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we introduce a simple model of 
infrastructure allocation across regions. This model allows us to obtain an infrastructure 
allocation equation. In the third section we introduce some modifications that need to be 
introduced before estimating the investment equation; the data base and econometric 
procedures are also discussed in this section. The results are presented in the fourth section. 
Finally, the last section concludes with an outline of possible utilities of the results and a brief 
discussion of some economic policy implications.  
2. A model of infrastructure allocation across regions 
The equation explaining the allocation of investment in transportation infrastructure across 
regions is obtained from the development of a stylized model combining two different blocks: 
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(i) a production function relating infrastructure capital stock to regional output, and (ii) a 
social choice rule that states that investment in a region depends on its output per head. The 
production function is the link that relates infrastructure investment in each region to regional 
output. We begin with the production block, introducing in a second stage the objective 
function. As the empirical analysis deals with transportation infrastructure, the discussion 
from now on will explicitly refer to the output effects of this type of infrastructure. 
(i) Production function 
Following Fernald (1999), we suppose that, for each region i and year t, output depends on 
inputs such as non-transportation private capital Kit, labor Lit, and transport services that are 
produced within the region, Tit. Output also depends on the Hicks-neutral level of technology, 
Pit. Transport services depend upon the flow of services provided by the government’s 
transportation infrastructure (Zit) and by a transportation input internal to regional firms as, 
for example, the stock of industrial vehicles (Xit)4. Hence, the regional production function 
takes the form: 
                                                )),(,,(. itititititit ZXTLKFPY =                                                (1) 
Most papers analysing the growth effects of infrastructures implicity assume that services 
provided by public capital are non-rival. Only recently some papers appeared extending the 
basic model to include congestion effects, both theoretically (Fisher and Turnovsky, 2000, 
and  Glomm and Ravikumar, 2000) and empirically (Fernald, 1999, and Boarnet, 2001). We 
take also into account that transportation infrastructures may be congested and, therefore, that 
the services provided by the infrastructure stock (Zit) depend on the size of that stock (Cit) but 
also on the level of utilization (Uit) 5. We assume for the moment a very flexible relationship 
among these three variables, Zit=Z(Cit, Uit), imposing only that Zc>0 y Zu<06. 
                                                           
4 From now on we will make reference to this input as vehicles, although its definition is somewhat 
more general. We must note that Fernald’s (1999) model was applied exclusively to roads. Therefore, 
connecting vehicles to roads was straightforward in that case. We feel, however, that the connection of 
vehicles and other transportation infrastructures (e.g., railroads, ports and airports) is equally plausible, 
given that inter-modality is a common feature of nowadays transportation of both people and goods.  
5 In the case of roads, utilization can be measured by number of km driven. In the case of railroads, 
ports and airports by number of passengers and  tons of goods  transported.  
6The most common functional form used to account for congestion is one that assumes a constant 
elasticity, like: Zit=Cit/Uitα, where α=1 in the case of a private good and α=0 in the case of a pure 
public (non-congested) good. This functional form has been used by Fernald (1999) in his analysis of 
road effects on productivity. However, it has been criticized on the grounds of exhibiting decreasing 
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Suppose now that firms are perfectly competitive and have constant returns to scale to private 
factors, which can be instantaneously adjusted. Let FJ represent the derivative of the 
production function F with respect to input J. Cost minimization implies that the elasticity of 
output with respect to J, FJJ/F, equals input’s share in revenue, SJ. By assumption, there are 
no economic profits, so the shares to private inputs sum to one. Given these assumptions and 
the specification of Zit, the effect on output of an increase in transportation infrastructure 
stock can be expressed as:  
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where Fc=∂F/∂C, Fz=∂F/∂Z and Zc=∂Z/∂C. The four elements that appear in Fc are: (i) the 
ratio between the elasticity of output with respect to government’s transportation services and 
the elasticity of output with respect to vehicles (ωit), (ii) the share of vehicles in output (Sit
x), 
(iii) the elasticity of infrastructure services to changes in the infrastructure stock (Eit
c), and 
(iv) the ratio of Fit to Cit. We expect ωit to be positive, which captures the notion that sectors 
relatively vehicle-intensive are also intensive in the use of government’s transportation 
infrastructure. Further assumptions about technology  help to simplify this expression and aid 
in interpreting the results. Suppose that Tit is separable from Kit and Lit, as is implicitly 
assumed in (1), and is produced with the same Cobb-Douglas technology in all the regions, so 
ωit=ω. Now expression (2) can be simplified as: 
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Expression (3) states that the marginal effect of transportation infrastructure differs from 
region to region. The effect is higher the lower the ratio of infrastructure stock to production. 
But this effect is also higher the higher is share of vehicles in output, meaning that infras-
tructure needs may depend also on the industrial mix of the region. It is also higher the higher 
the elasticity of infrastructure services to the stock. As we will argue below, it is quite 
possible for Eit
c to increase with utilization, meaning that the marginal effect of infras-
tructures is higher where there is more congestion. The central government will take into 
account all those effects when deciding about the regional distribution of transportation 
infrastructure. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
marginal congestion while theory (Edwards, 1990) and empirical analysis of road use (Inman, 1978) 
suggest that congestion should be growing in the margin.  
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(ii) Social choice rule 
We assume that transportation infrastructure investment is distributed among regions “as if” 
there is a constrained maximization of a central government social welfare function, defined 
over the distribution of output among the regions of the country. Following the approach of 
Behrman y Craig (1987), we use a CES social welfare function that allows varying degrees of 
relative regional inequality aversion and, at the same time, unequal treatment of regions with 
the same output levels7. This social welfare function can be expressed as: 
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 where Nit and Yit/Nit are population and output per head of region i in year t. The φ parameter 
quantifies the aversion to regional output inequality, and its variation range goes from ∞−  to 
one. As φ becomes more negative, inequality aversion increases. When φ → ∞−  the function 
approaches the pure equity concerns case. In the intermediate Cobb-Douglas case φ is zero. 
And if φ is equal to one, then the government is exclusively worried about efficiency. In this 
case, W equals national output (W=Y). The estimation of the φ parameter is one of the main 
purposes of the paper, since its value will tell us about the relative weight assigned to 
efficiency and redistribution in investment allocation. 
The parameters Ψit  differ form region to region and relate to equal vs. unequal concern. If 
there is equal concern, Ψit =Ψt for all regions. If there is unequal concern, Ψit depends on 
region’s specific characteristics. Those parameters are, therefore, an indicator of the deviation 
of the central government investment from an investment allocation rule strictly based on the 
equity-efficiency trade-off implicit in the φ parameter. In our context the most straightforward 
interpretation of the Ψit  parameters is to consider that they pick up political considerations 
that make a region attractive enough to the government to justify a deviation from the equity-
efficiency rule. As we will see in the empirical section, electoral considerations (e.g., risk of 
losing political representatives) play an important role in the distribution of transportation 
investment across regions8. 
                                                           
7 See Behrman and Craig (1987) and Craig and Heikkila (1989) for empirical studies applying this 
methodology to the distribution of police inputs among city districts, and Behrman and Sah (1984) for 
a paper applying it to the distribution of international aid across developing countries. 
8It must be noted that Behrman and Craig (1987) use economic and demographic variables in order to 
account for Ψit. Although these may also be included in our analysis we feel that they will ultimately 
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The main advantage of this approach to the social decision rule applied to the distribution of 
public investment across regions is its relative simplicity, allowing to obtain a solution easy to 
implement at the empirical level, while simultaneously accounting for the equity-efficiency 
trade-off (quantified by φ) and the deviation from it (quantified by Ψit). As we will show 
below, with this approach we will obtain an equation explaining the determinants of 
government’s investment in different regions that is additive in output and political factors. 
This fact makes possible the decompose investment variance in the share due to the equity-
efficiency trade-off and the share due to political calculus. One drawback may be that the 
approach does not provide an structural model of government behavior. However, we have to 
note that recent theoretical articles in the political economy field end up with very similar 
specifications, where output and political factors are additively combined9. 
(iii) Optimal infrastructure stock 
The problem of the central government consists of choosing a regional distribution of 
transportation investment to maximize the function (4), taking into account the effect of 
transportation infrastructure capital on output (3), and an exogenous budget constraint like:  
                                                                ∑ ≤
i
tit RI                                                                 (5) 
where Iit is investment in region i and year t and Rt are resources available to invest in 
transportation infrastructure in a given year t. We take Rt  as given and constant across re-
gions. The first assumption is consistent with investment budgeting practices in Spain, since 
the overall level of investment for a given year is determined before its distribution by catego-
ries and regions10.  This first assumption is also consistent with our empirical purpose, since 
we will analyze the empirical factors that drive the regional distribution of investment, 
controlling for total investment effort done in a given year. Thus, we do not aim to explain 
why the total amount of investment made by the government changes from year to year. The 
second assumption, constancy of available resources across regions, picks up the fact that the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
account for the political cloud of the region. It is less clear  that they will pick up differences in needs, 
since this factor has been already accounted for by the specific form of the production function.  
9 See, for example, the work of Dixit and Londregan (1998),  that model politicians as having partisan 
preferences with respect to the efficiency-equity trade-off but that also care about reelection.  
10 This amount is determined each year depending on the availability of resources and the need for 
fiscal consolidation. All planned investment projects are then ranked by a budgetary committee, and 
the amount of resources available for investment determines the number of these projects to be 
undertook next year.   
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central government is dividing a common pie among the different regions. However, this 
procedure does not account for the fact that some funds are earmarked to specific regions. 
Concretely, some regions are entitled to a minimum investment level that comes from the 
European Funds (e.g., ERDF, Cohesion Fund) and from Spanish regional policy. To control 
for this fact we could have included this minimum amount as an additional constraint. The 
problem is, however, that we are not able to measure it at the geographical level we employ in 
the analysis. If the restriction is not binding (i.e., the level of investment in the region ends up 
being higher than the minimum) the omission will be irrelevant. However, nothing guarantees 
that this would happen in practice. As we will explain more in detail in the empirical section 
we will try to control for this including as explanatory variables an interaction of the set of 
time effects with a dummy that identifies the regions that are entitled to these funds.  
Differentiating (4) subject to (3) and (5) with respect to transportation investment in a given 
region and year, we obtain the following first order condition: 
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where λt  is the marginal cost of public revenues, that we allow to change from year to year. 
The different terms of expression (6) can be obtained by differentiation of (4) and (3), taking 
into account (5) and ∂Cit/∂Iit=111. Substituting these expressions again into (6) and taking 
logs, we are able to obtain the following expression for the optimal stock of infrastructures for 
each region (lnCit
*): 
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where Bit=lnPit + lnω + (1-φ)/φ.lnWt - λt. Expression (7) can be interpreted as follows. The 
capital stock that the government plans for a region depends on the efficiency-equity trade-
off, implicit in the linear combination of output and population. Note than in the pure 
efficiency case (i.e., when φ=1), population disappears from the equation and the coefficient 
of output is equal to one. If the social welfare function is Cobb-Douglas, then φ=0 and only 
population (with a coefficient of one) appears in the equation. As φ becomes more negative, 
output appears in the equation with a negative coefficient and population with a positive 
                                                           
11 This result derives directly from the permanent inventory equation that relates capital stock and 
investment: Cit=(1-δ).Cit-1 + Iit, where δ is the annual depreciation rate of capital. 
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coefficient that is higher than one. Note that for the government to have equity concerns, φ 
need not be negative; it suffices if φ is lower than one.  
Therefore, equation (7) provides a simple way to test the for the strength of efficiency and 
equity in the regional distribution of investment. Moreover, note that this test is conditional to 
the inclusion in the equation of different kinds of controls. First, it includes variables 
accounting for different regional infrastructure needs, picked up by the vehicle output-share 
(Sxit) and variables related to infrastructure congestion (lnE
c
it). Second, it also includes varia-
bles related to the political cloud of the region (lnΨit). Therefore, we can conclude that 
equation (7) provides a characterization of the factors leading regional investment allocation: 
efficiency-equity trade-off, infrastructure needs and political factors.  
3. Empirical implementation 
3.1 Some methodological aspects 
Some further aspects should be taken into account to ensure that equation (7) is implemen-
table: (i) inclusion of individual and time effects, (ii)  dynamics of investment decisions, and 
(iii) multiple levels of government investing in transportation infrastructures at the same time.  
(i) Individual and time effects 
Some measurement problems recommend to include both individual and time effects in the 
investment equation (7). First, it is difficult to quantify the Bit  term. Observe from (7) that this 
term includes some factors that are invariant across regions (i.e., lnWt and λt) and that can be 
controlled through the inclusion of time effects (ft). However, Bit also includes the term lnPit, 
that picks up all those aspects that influence technology. The use of a panel of data also 
allows to control these influences through the inclusion of time (ft) and regional effects (fi).  
Second, the model is not able to fully capture the overall institutional complexity involved in 
providing and financing infrastructure investment. For example, in Spain some regional 
governments have more transportation investment responsibilities than others. As the division 
of responsibilities in this area has not changed during the period analyzed, we can control for 
this fact by including regional effects in the equation. Another example are earmarked 
investment funds since, as we explain before, its quantification has enormous difficulties. By 
including regional effects we control for the fact that some regions receive these funds while 
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others do not, a trait that is constant through the period. By including time effects we control 
by the fact that the total amount of funds received has changed over time. However, these 
funding increases only benefit the recipient regions. Because of this we include also an 
interaction between the time effects and a dummy equal to one for a recipient region (ηi). 
Therefore, Bit can be expressed as Bit = fi + ft + ηi × ft + εit,  being εit an uncorrelated error term 
with zero mean and constant variance. 
(ii) Dynamics  
With the aim to give more realism to the representation of the investment decision-making 
process, we may consider that it would be difficult for the government to instantaneously  
adapt the allocation of investment to a region after a change in its characteristics. A rigorous 
treatment of this question would have required to model investment decisions in an inter-
temporal framework, as in Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1989 and 1993). However, as our purpose 
is related basically to the empirical implementation of equation (7), we will use a more 
practical approach, consisting of using a partial adjustment model. We assume that the 
infrastructure stock in a region will be the last period stock (i.e., lnCit-1) plus a portion (ρ) of 
the difference between that stock and the planned infrastructure stock (lnCit
*). That is: 
                                                       )ln  - .(ln   ln ln 11 −
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+= itititit CCCC ρ                                (8) 
Substituting (8) in (7) and using the regional and time effects representation of Bit we obtain 
the following expression: 
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The estimation a dynamic panel equation like this poses some econometric problems. All the 
transformations commonly used to eliminate regional effects introduce correlation between 
the lagged endogenous variable and the error term, biasing OLS estimators if the time 
dimension of the panel is not large (Nickel, 1981, Arellano and Bond, 1991). A possible 
solution to this problem consists of taking first differences in (9) and then estimate the 
resulting equation by instrumental variables or GMM  (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981; Holtz-
Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 1988, and Arellano and Bond, 1991). We will explain more in 
detail the econo-metric procedure latter; for the moment it suffices to note that it will require 
the estimation of the model in first differences. Therefore, expression (9) becomes: 
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(iii) Multiple levels of government  
Equation (10) aims to explain the change in the transportation infrastructure stock of the 
central government allocated to different regions. However, unfortunately, available data for 
the central government refers to investment instead of capital stocks12. But, as expressions (9) 
and (10) suggest it would not be appropriate to analyze investment behavior without conside-
ring the previous level of capital stock. Moreover, since in Spain different layers of govern-
ment invest in transportation infrastructures, it may not be appropriate to analyze central 
government’s investment decisions without taking into account the investment made by sub-
national governments13. Therefore, it might be appropriate to account for the possibility of 
substitutability/complementarity in the production function of the infrastructures provided by 
different layers of government. This interrelation may ultimately make central government’s 
investment depend on investment made by the other layers14.  
This section proposes a simple transformation in order to be able to estimate the model with 
investment made by the central government as the dependent variable and with the investment 
made by subnational governments as an additional explanatory variable. First, after some 
operations on the permanent inventory equation we are able to write15:   
                                                          ∆lnCit ≅ (Iit /Cit-1) - δ                                                     (11) 
Second, we assume that when computing the increase of the capital stock, the central govern-
ment considers both the increase due to its own investment and a proportion θ of the invest-
                                                           
12 As we will explain in the next section, the available data base does not provide information on 
capital stocks by level of government (Fundación BBVA, 1998). The capital stock provided is total 
capital stock but information about gross investment is presented by level of government. 
13 For example, both the central government and the regional and local governments have some 
responsibilities regarding road construction. Although the nature of those roads differs among layers 
(i.e., the central government is the only one having responsibilities in inter-regional motorways), they 
can be hardly considered as independent as production inputs.  
14 See Aronsson et al. (2000) for an analysis of interactions in the spending decisions made by 
different layers of government in Sweden. In that case, the source of expenditure interactions is the 
relationship among goods in the utility function, not among factors in the production function. This 
work is also related to a recent but growing literature that analyzes tax interactions among levels of 
govern-ment (e.g., Besley and Rosen, 1998  and Goodspeed, 2001). 
15 By rearranging the permanent inventory equation and after taking logs we find that ∆lnCit = ln(1+ Iit 
/Cit-1 - δ); the left hand side can be approximated by Iit /Cit-1 - δ  when this expression approaches zero.                             
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ment made by the other levels of government. This parameter measures the degree of substi-
tutability between investments made by different levels of government. If θ=1, the central 
government is indifferent about which level of government is ultimately responsible for the 
increase in the capital stock. If θ=0, investment projects of the different levels of government 
are completely independent. Of course, in the current period, the central government does not 
know the investment that will be made by the other layers. We now assume that the central 
government expects that investment made by other layers will be roughly the same than the 
year before. Taking this into account then we can express (11) as:  
                                        )/.(/ln 211 −−− +≅∆ it
s
itit
c
itit CICIC θ                                            (12) 
Where c is central and s subnational (i.e., regional + local). In the case of ∆lnCit-1, the central 
government already knows the amount invested the year before and therefore we can write: 
                                      )/.(/ln 21211 −−−−− +≅∆ it
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Substituting expressions (12) and (13) in (10) and ordering terms, we obtain the following 
equation explaining investment made by the central government (Icit/Cit-1): 
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This expression states that investment made by the central government in a region in a given 
year depends on the investment it made the year before (due to adjustment costs), but also on 
the investment made the year before by other layers of government. The significance of 
investment made by other layers will ultimately provide a check of the need to include this 
variable in the equation.  
Equation (14) constitutes the focus of the empirical analysis. However, this equation will also 
be estimated with investment data corresponding to the aggregate of all government levels. In 
this case the specification will differ a bit from expression (14). The first difference is that, in 
this case, there would be no need investment made by other layers of government as an 
explanatory variable. The second difference is that the parameter λt (appearing as a part of Bit) 
can not be considered constant across regions. The reason is that regionally or locally 
financed investment depends on the budget constrain of subnational governments, which is 
not identical across regions. Some variables should be included in the equation to account for 
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these differences. Third, political factors specific of regional and local governments (Ψ’it) 
should be included in the equation. With these changes, the equation explaining investment 
made by all layers of government (Iit/Cit-1) can be expressed as: 
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3.2 Sample, variables and data sources 
Equations (14) and (15) will be estimated separately with data on transportation infrastructure 
investment made by the central government and by all levels of government in each of the 50 
Spanish departments (NUTS3) during the period 1987-96. The source of data on capital stock 
and infrastructure investment by government level and region is: Fundación BBVA (1998), 
“The capital stock in Spain and its territorial distribution”. This data base has been previously 
used in many empirical analysis estimating production functions and growth equations and its 
accuracy is widely accepted16. 
Two different equations will be estimated, one for total transportation investment (including 
roads, railroads, ports and airports) and another one for roads, that are the main category 
covering more than half of all transportation investments. We decide not to include separate 
regressions for other categories because, first, each of them represents a low share of the total 
and, second, because its analysis is affected by some problems. For example, investments in 
nodal infrastructures (e.g., ports and airports) only occur in the regions having these facilities. 
Investments in these categories also use to come in big individual projects, meaning that a 
higher volatility is observed in the series of regional investment (e.g., construction of a high 
speed railroad may cause an spike in investment in one period that would not repeat in the 
following years). However, we feel that a broader category may not be equally affected by 
this problem.  
We choose NUTS3 regions as a unit of analysis (instead of NUTS2) for two reasons. First, 
because of a pure econometric concern about the the number of observations available (N =50 
instead of N=17 in the NUTS2 case). Second, because the calculation of some of the variables 
included in the model only has sense in the NUTS3 case. For example, as will be later 
                                                           
16 See e.g,., Mas et al. (1996), and De la Fuente and Vives (1995) for analysis using this data set; Mas 
et al.(2000) provides a description of the method of calculation of capital stocks. 
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explained, some political variables are included to pick up the electoral cloud of the regions. 
But since electoral jurisdictions for general elections in Spain are NUTS3 regions it may be 
inappropriate to tie the electoral incentives to broader areas. There are also various reasons 
that justify the focus on the period 1987-96. The first one is that while data on regional 
allocation of investment and capital stocks are available in Spain for a broader period (see 
Fundación BBVA, 1998), the information about investments made by the different layers is 
not available until the eighties. The second one is that actual infrastructure responsibilities of 
regional governments (Comunidades Autónomas) were not completed until the middle of the 
eighties17.Therefore, it is important to exclude this first period from the analysis. Third, 
because the information needed to quantify some of the variables (i.e., those coming form the 
production function, as vehicles and utilisation) is not available for a longer period.  
Explanatory variables can be classified in three groups: economic variables, political variables 
and control variables picking up the financial resources of regional governments. Table 1 
summarizes the definitions of the variables and data sources. Among economic variables, we 
have included both output growth (∆lnYit) and population growht (∆lnNit), and variables 
coming directly form the specificaction of the production function (∆lnSxit and ∆lnEcit). 
Output growth is real regional GDP growth at market prices.  
[Table 1 about here] 
The share of vehicles in output (Sxit) has been proxied by a log-linear relationship among 
number of trucks and GDP, of the form: Sxit=(Trucksit/Yit)δ. Trucks are the actual number of 
trucks and other industrial vehicles (e.g., vans) in each region. This is the best way to deal 
with this problem, given the unavailability of information on vehicle capital stocks18. The 
elasticity of infrastructure services to infrastructure stock (∆lnEcit) has been proxied by 
variables quantifying the growth in the number of users. That is, we assume that the effect of 
an increase in the stock (e.g., reduction of congestion) is higher the higher is the level of users 
of this stock19. The variables used to compute the increase in the number of users have been 
                                                           
17 In addition to this, the regional financing system was highly provisional until second half of that 
decade. The equation explaining investment made by all levels of governments will include some 
variables measuring the financial position of regional governments.  
18 Of course, it would have been more appropriate to follow the procedure used in Fernald (1999); that 
is, to compute the annual consumption of vehicle services as the product of the vehicle stock and a 
user cost of vehicle capital (accounting for depreciation and fiscal treatment).  
19 Many empirical papers use a constant-elasticy especification of the level of services provided by 
infrastructures: Zit=Cit/Uitα. Note, however, that in this case Ecit=1 in all the regions and this term will 
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selected to represent different kinds of transportation infrastructures. In the case of roads the 
variable used is the increase in the number of km per year travelled by vehicles in each region 
(∆lnKmit). In the case of airports and railroads, we use growth in passengers/year (∆lnAirit and 
∆lnRailit)20, and in the case of ports  growth in tons of goods transported per year (∆lnPortit).  
Variables included in the Ψit term pick up political factors considered by the central 
government when allocating funds to the regions. Some recent political economy papers may 
help in selecting these variables (Levitt and Snyder, 1995, Johansson, 1999, Cadot et al., 
1999, and Case, 2001). In these papers the main determinants of regional redistribution are, 
for example, the potential electoral gains in the region, the desire to benefit party constituent-
cies, or the presence of active interest groups in some regions. Here we will focus on the first 
two factors: potential electoral gains and partisan effects. We consider that potential electoral 
profitability in a region depends on the probability of gaining or loosing representatives 
therein21. To account for this effect we include in the equation a variable (Marginit) that 
measures the proportion of votes that the incumbent party would have needed to gain or loose 
one additional representative in the region in the last election held. This variable has been 
computed for the elections of 1982, 1989 and 1993 through a very simple algorithm that 
reproduces the electoral rule system d’Hondt. First, we calculate the proportion of votes 
needed for the socialist government (the incumbent in the three contests) to gain and lose a 
representative in the upper chamber (Congreso). Second, the variable  (Marginit) is computed 
as the minimum of these two values for each region22. The expected sign for this variable is 
negative: the marginal benefit of investing in a region is higher the lower is the number of 
votes needed to gain or loose a representative. In fact, the inclusion of this variable may be 
considered an extension of the analysis of Case (2001), which quantifies the margin of victory 
as the distance between the vote proportion in the last election and 50%. Of course, this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
disappear form our specification. To allow Ecit depend on the number of users one has to posit a more 
general functional form, as for example the translog function used by Boarnet (2001).  
20 In this last case the data is available only for the period 1991-96. Because of this the equations in 
which this variable appears have been estimated only with data belonging to this sample. 
21Electoral profitability also depends on the size of the region (given the lack of proprotionality of the 
electoral system). To account for this effect we included a new variable: the ratio between population 
and number of representatives in each region. However, this variable displayed too low temporal 
variation to be used in an equation in differences. 
22The calculation assumes that all the votes lost or gained by the incumbent are gained or lost by the 
second party in number of votes in the region. We repeated the calculation with different vote shifting 
assumptions (e.g., distribution according to previous vote share). However, the results of the variable 
Marginit in the investment equation are not qualitatively altered.  
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procedure may not be entirely appropriate in our case, since Spain is not a pure bi-partisan 
system and the rela-tionship between votes and representatives depends on the operation of 
the d’Hondt system. 
The second political factor considered is the will to provide benefits for own party 
constituencies. We take this factor into account by including a variable that measures the 
absolute electoral support received by the incumbent party in the region: the proportion of 
votes obtained by the incumbent in the last election (Vgovit/Vtotit). We expect this variable to 
have a positive sign; that is, the central government invests more in the regions were it 
receives more electoral support. We include also other political variables that may account 
either for the first or the second factor, or for both. The first variable accounts for the 
similarity of the partisan orientation of the central and the regional governments; as in all the 
period analyzed the central government was controlled by the socialist party, the variable used 
is a dummy equal to one if the regional government is on the left wing of the political 
spectrum (dleft(R)it). We also include a dummy equal to one if the main party in the regional 
government gives support to the central government during the period 1993-96 (dmin(C)it)23. 
We expect a positive sign for both variables; that is, we expect that the central government 
invests more in regions controlled by socialists, and during the period 1993-96, also in regions 
controlled by parties whose support is needed to sustain the executive.  
In the equations explaining investment activity by all levels of government (15), an additional 
set of political variables (Ψit’) are included. These are a dummy equal to one if regional 
elections are held during the year in the region (deyearit), and a dumy equal to one if the 
regional government does not have a majority of representatives in the regional parliament 
(dmin(R)it). We expect a higher level of investment in electoral years but the sign of dmin(R)it  
is uncertain. Some papers suggest that governments with a low degree of internal cohesion 
will spend more due to the highest difficulty to stop the redistributive pressures they find (see, 
e.g., Roubini and Sachs, 1989, and Alt and Lowry, 1995). However, this effect needs not to be 
the same in all expenditure categories. A possible story may be, for example, the cut in invest-
ment projects due, precisely, to the success of other redistributive programs.  
                                                           
23In these years the socialists were in minority in the central government and received the support of 
the nationalist parties of the regions of Catalonia, Basque Country and Canary Islands. 
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Finally, equation (15) also includes some variables accounting for the budget constraint of 
each regional government (λit). These variables are: unconditional revenues (Revit), capital 
transfers (Capit), and the debt level (Debtit). All these variables are computed for the NUTS2 
region that is the level of aggregation corresponding to regional governments in Spain. 
Therefore, it value is the same for all the NUTS3 regions included in the same regional 
government. The sign expected is positive in the case of the resource variables and negative in 
the case of debt.  
3.3 Econometric issues 
Before estimating equations (14) and (15) two main econometric problems should be 
addressed: (i) the possible endogeneity of some explanatory variables, and (ii) the estimation 
of a dynamic panel data model. 
The endogeneity problem affects mainly to the output growth variable (∆lnYit). In fact, the 
production function states that ∆lnYit is a function of ∆lnCit, meaning that reverse causality 
may be a problem. This problem may affect also the variables included in the ∆lnSxit and 
∆lnEcit terms. Although we have not proposed any explanatory model for these variables, it is 
easy to tell some story to explain how infrastructure improvement in a region biases the 
economic structure of the region increasing the share of vehicle-intensive sector. A similar 
explanation could be invoked to argue that an infrastructure improvement may in fact increase 
the level of traffic and, therefore, create more congestion in the long run24. The solution we 
have adopted to solve this problem consists of introducing all these variables in the estimated 
equation with a lag. That is, we consider that all of them are predetermined. This way to 
proceed is consistent with the information set that the central government has when deciding 
how much to invest in a region. We feel thus it is appropriate to assume that this information 
set only includes past values of the variables. The only variables that are introduced 
simultaneously are the political ones.  
Regarding the second problem, note that equations in first differences (14) and (15) include 
the lagged value of the dependent variable (Iit-1/C it-1). In addition to that, if the error term in 
the levels equation (εit) was uncorrelated, then error term in the differenced equation will 
show negative first order autocorrelation (εit -εit-1). If this is the case, the lagged dependent 
                                                           
24 Although, as recently has been shown by Prakash et al. (2001), this relationship is not supported by 
the data, at least in the UK.  
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variable will be correlated with the error term and OLS estimators will be biased if the 
number of years in the panel is small (Nickel, 1981, and Arellano and Bond, 1991). The 
solution to this problem consist of estimating equations (14) and (15) by the Generalizad 
Method of Moments (GMM), using lagged values of variables in levels as instruments  
(Arellano and Bond, 1991)25. In our case, we will use as instuments for Iit-1/C it-1 three lags of 
infrastructure stock (lnCt-2, lnCt-3 and lnCt-4). These instruments will be the same for all the 
years in the sample.This procedure will not suppose loosing any of the cross-sections, because 
we have information for the instruments in years preceding those of used in the analysis.  
The assumption of no serial correlation in εit is crucial to guarantee the consistency of the 
GMM estimator. For this reason, we will provide two tests of serial correlation. We expect to 
find first order serial correlation in the residuals but not second order serial correlation. We 
also include a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to check for the validity of the set of 
instruments (Arellano y Bond, 1991). This test is distributed under the null of instrument 
validity as a χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of overidentifying restrictions.  
4. Results 
The results obtained in the estimation of equation (14) are presented in Table 2. The first three 
columns correspond to the investment made by the central government in transportation 
infrastructure, while the other three correspond to the investment in roads. Table 3 shows the 
results obtained when repeating the exercise for the investment made by all levels of 
government (equation 15). The explanatory capacity of the model is high in both cases, with 
an adjusted R2 around 60%. The bottom of both tables shows the results of a battery of 
specification statistics. In all the cases, the time effects are significant but the hypothesis that 
are the same both for regions receiving and not receiving earmarked investment funds can not 
be rejected. Also the serial correlation tests shows that there is first order serial correlation in 
the residuals of the differenced model but no second order correlation. This fact gives us some 
confidence in the appropriateness of the instrument set, that is confirmed by the results of the 
Sargan test.  
                                                           
25In presence of heteroscedasticy and residual serial correlation it is more efficient to use the two-step 
GMM procedure. However, as Arellano and Bond (1991) note, this estimator is rather inefficient. 
Following the recommendation of these authors, we present the results of the first-step GMM 
estimator.   
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The order of presentation of the results in Tables 2 and 3 is the same. Columns (a) and (d) 
show the results of a specification that only includes as variables: lagged investment made by 
the central government and lagged investment made by other layers of government (only in 
Table 2), output growth, population growth and the ratio of trucks to output. Columns (b) and 
(e) show the results obtained when adding the utilization variables. Finally, the specification 
in columns (c) and (f) also includes the political variables and the other control variables.  
Regarding the results obtained, we must highlight the following conclusions. First, investment 
made both by the central government and by all levels of government adjust slowly towards 
the optimal capital stock. The value of the adjustment coefficient ρ moves between 0.24 and 
0.27, depending on the equation.  Given that the economic variables enter in the equation with 
a lag, this means that investment needs from 4 to 5 years to fully adjust in response to an 
exogenous regional shock. Second, the coefficient estimated for the investment made by other 
layers of government in Table 2 is negative and statistically significant in all the cases. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis of substitutability among the investment made by 
different layers of government. The θ  parameter ranges from -0.16 (≈-0.042/(1-0.733)) in the 
case of Transportation to -0.27 in the case of roads. This fact suggests that if a subnational 
government invests 4 additional euro in roads, the central government will reduce its road 
investment in the same region by 1 euro.  
[Table 2 and 3 about here] 
Third, the results also show that infrastructure investment is sensitive to output growth and 
the coefficients are statistically significant at a conventional level. This happens irrespective 
of the level of government involved (i.e.,central vs. all levels) and  of the category analysed 
(i.e., transportation or roads). In the central government case the coefficient is equal to 0.15 in 
both cases (1.c and 1.f), implying a value for φ  around 0.5 (see Table 4 estimated values of 
the structural parameters). According to this result, the central government does not follow 
exclusively an efficiency criteria when allocating infrastructure investment across regions 
(recall that this requires φ =1). In the case of investment made by all levels of government the 
output coefficient is 0.18 for transportation and 0.20 for roads, meaning that the parameter φ  
is 0.73 and 0.77, respectively. Therefore, it seems that the infrastructure investment policy 
conducted by the overall Spanish public sector is more efficiency-oriented than that of the 
central government. In fact, a simple calculation suggests that φ for the subnational govern-
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ments would be very close to one26. These results are not surprising; after all, subnational 
governments only worry about growth promotion in its own jurisdiction, while the central 
government cares both about national output growth and about its regional distribution.  
Fourth, the impact of population growth is positive and statistically significant (although only 
at the 90% in most equations). In all the cases the population coefficient is lower than the 
output coefficient. In addition to that, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the 
population coefficient (1-φ) is equal to one minus the output coefficient (φ). Therefore, the 
main results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model.   
[Table 4 about here] 
Five, the growth in the output-share of transportation services (Sx), proxied by ∆ln(Truckst-
1/Yt-1), also has a positive and highly statistically significant impact on investment. In the case 
of transportation investment the long term effect (Table 4) is 0.517 for the central government 
and 0.640 for all levels. In the case of roads the coefficients are higher, of 0.756 and 0.840, 
respectively. Therefore, although vehicle-intensity may be a better proxy for trans-portation 
service intensity in the case of roads, it has also a considerable effect in the case of other 
transportation infrastructures. The utilization variables appear to have a lower impact on 
investment. The growth in vehicle-km (∆lnKmt-1) has a positive impact in all the equations, 
although the coefficient is significant only at the 90% level and not in all the cases. In the case 
of investment made by the central government, the long term coefficient of this variable 
(Table 3) is 0.048 for transportation and 0.087 for roads. So, the effect is higher in the case of 
roads. This also occurs in the equations explaining investment made by all levels of 
government. Growing utilization of railroads, ports and airports also have a positive impact 
on transportation investment, although only the last variable is statistically significant.  
Six, the political variables appear, in general, with the expected sign. Let’s first analyze its 
effects on the investment decisions made by the central government. The sign of the dummy 
dleft(R)it is always positive bur never significant at conventional levels. Thus, we can not 
conclude that the central government invest more in ideologically akin regions. The support 
of nationalist parties to the central government also has a positive impact on infrastructure 
investment, although only significant at the 90% in the case of roads. The sign of the variable 
                                                           
26 To do this simple exercise assume that the φ of all levels is just a weighted average of those of 
central and subnational governments, and use as a weight the share of the central government in 
investment in theses categories (that was nearly 40% in 2001, Ministerio de Fomento).  
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that measures the vote-share of the incumbent party (Vgovit/Vtotit) is positive in the two 
equation but only statistically significant in the case of roads. The impact of the variable 
Marginit is negative and significant in the two equations. These results suggest that the 
objectives of incumbent parties (at least in the case of roads) are mixed: they invest where it is 
more profitable in terms of votes but also where partisan support is higher. Although the 
parameter values are not really high, they can not be neglected. For example, the parameter of 
the road equation means that a reduction of one point in the margin of victory in a region (say 
from 2% to 1% of votes) would force an increase of 0.135 in the growth rate of road 
infrastructures. Since the average sample value for Marginit is 3.66%, this means that for the 
average region in the sample, having this margin (instead of a value of zero) causes a 0.49% 
drop in road investment made by the central government (the mean sample value for this 
variable being 6.02%)27. 
In the case of investment made by all levels of government the only political variable that 
remains statistically significant is also Marginit. The coefficient in the transportation equa-
tion is quite similar than in the central government’s case, although only significant at the 
90% level. However this variable remains highly significant at the 99% in the road equation. 
This result suggest that investment made by regional government is also used as a tool in 
general election contests. After all, the parties that compete in the general elections also 
compete in regional contests. And if it is worth to invest in a contested department, this will 
be true both for the party in the central government and for the party in the regional 
government (that may or may not be the same)28.  
Seven, the variables accounting for the budget constraint of regional governments appear with 
the expected sign in equation explaining investment made by all the layers of government: 
unconditional revenues (ln∆Revit) and capital funds (ln∆Capit) have a positive effect while 
debt has a negative effect (ln∆Debtit). The coefficient of capital funds is not significant at 
conventional levels, although it is of similar magnitude than the other ones.  
 
                                                           
27 We also tried another specification allowing different responses in regions where the margin of 
victory is positive and negative. The results were similar in both cases. 
28 One may be tempted to suggest that this result is due to a higher amount of transfers from the central 
government to the regional or local governments in these pivotal regions. This is not very plausible, 
since the amount of resources available for regional governments has been already controlled in the 
equation.  
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5. Conclusions 
This paper has analyzed the main determinants of transportation infrastructure investment 
allocation across regions. The investment equation is derived from a simple theoretical model 
that accounts simultaneously for an efficiency-equity trade-off, political factors and specific 
regional infrastructures needs. This equation has been estimated with data on transportation 
investment and capital stock in 50 Spanish NUTS3 regions. We have analyzed separately the 
investment made by the central government and the investment made by all levels of 
government. The results suggest that the central government balances equity and efficiency in 
the allocation of regional government but that investment by all the levels of government is 
more inclined towards efficiency. Technical aspects influencing the output effects of 
transportation infrastructure provision (i.e., output-vehicle share, level of utilization) also 
appear to be relevant. However, government’s motives are not confined to the efficiency-
equity trade-off: political considerations play also a role in the regional investment allocation 
process. The central government invests more in the regions where the risk of gaining or 
loosing a representative is higher but also in regions (at least in the case of roads) where 
partisan support is higher. The financing system of regional governments also seems to play a 
role in the investment made by all levels of government.  
We consider that the result obtained may be useful both in terms of valued added to the 
literature on economic effects of infrastructures and in analyzing economic policy options. 
For example, both the theoretical model and the results suggest that infrastructure capital 
responds positively to output growth. This will ultimately mean that infrastructure capital 
should be considered as endogenous in production function estimation. Although this concern 
has been raised by many authors (Duffy-Deno y Eberts, 1991, Tatom, 1991 y 1993, Cadot et 
al., 1999, Fernald, 1999, and Röller and Waverman, 2000) it is not always clear at all how to 
proceed to solve the econometric problem. Our results will help in the selection of 
instruments to be used in the estimation of the production function. A different paper, Castells 
et al. (2001), uses the same data set to regress growth in total factor productivity on growth in 
transportation infrastructure. The elasticitiy obtained when infrastructure growth is instru-
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mented with some of the political variables identified here (e.g., Marginit, Vgovit/Vtotit) is 
twice that the one obtained by OLS estimation29.  
Another possible application of the results of the paper consists of combining the coefficient 
estimates (mainly that of the efficiency-equity trade off, φ) with an estimate of the output-
elasticity of infrastructure capital to compute the efficiency loss of a given allocation rule. 
This result may help in order to appropriately judge the desirability of maintaining current 
redistributive regional policies. The model also allows us to calculate the possible welfare loss 
due to unequal treatment arising from political discrimination. A calculation like this would 
help to evaluate the need to maintain the actual ability of the central government to change 
regional investment allocation at his will or, to the contrary, the appropriateness of a reform 
based on objective rules. This paper is only a modest step towards the understanding of this 
problems and further and deeper analysis would be needed in the future. Possible 
improvements and extensions may include, for example, the consideration of private 
transportation infrastructures, the proper treatment of nodal infrastructures, or the estimation 
of the effects of european regional funds on infras-tructure investment made by the different 
layers of government.  
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Table 1 
Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
Ict/C t-1 Investment by central government a year 
divided by capital stock the year before 
Fundación BBVA (1998) 
I t/C t-1 Investment by all levels of government a 
year divided by capital stock the year 
before 
Fundación BBVA (1998) 
Ist-1/C t-2 Investment by subnationall governments 
the  year before divided by capital stock 
two years before 
Fundación BBVA (1998) 
∆lnYt-1 Output growth rate  Regional Accounts, Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística (INE) 
∆lnNt-1 Population growth rate  Population Statistics 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) 
∆ln(Truckst-1/Yt-1) Growth rate of the ratio trucks on output Ministerio de Fomento 
∆lnKmt-1 Growth rate of vehicles-km per year Ministerio de Fomento 
∆lnRailt-1 Growth rate in rail passengers per year RENFE 
∆lnPortt-1 Growth rate in tons transported per year Ministerio de Fomento 
∆lnAirt-1 Growth rate in air passengers per year Ministerio de Fomento 
dleft(R)t  Dummy equal to one if the regional 
government is on the left-wing spectrum 
of the political arena 
Anuario EL PaíS 
dmin(C)t Dummy equal to one if the main party in 
the regional government gives support to 
the central government that is in 
minority 
Anuario EL PaíS 
Vgovt/Vtott 
 
Incumbent’s share of votes in the last 
election 
Anuario EL PaíS 
Margint % of votes needed for the incumbent to 
gain/loost a representative in the last 
election 
Anuario EL PaíS and own calculations 
dmin(R)t 
 
Dummy equal to one if the regional 
government is in minority in the regional 
parliament 
Anuario EL PaíS 
deyear(R)t 
 
Dummy equal to one if regional 
elections are held in that region and year
Anuario EL PaíS 
∆lnRevt-1 
 
Growth of general revenues of the 
regional government (Own taxes and 
charges + Ceded taxes + General 
transfers from the central gov. – General 
transfers to the central gov.)  
Liquidación de los Presupuestos de las 
CCAA and Informe sobre la 
financiación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas (Ministerio de Economía) 
∆lnCapt 
 
Growth of capital revenues of the 
regional government (European funds + 
Spanish regional policy + joint tasks + 
other specific grants) 
Liquidación de los Presupuestos de las 
CCAA and Informe sobre la 
financiación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas (Ministerio de Economía) 
∆lnDebtt-1 
 
Growth in net debt of the regional 
government 
Anuario Estadístico (Banco de España) 
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Table 2 
Determinants of infrastructure investment, Central government, 1987-96.  
GMM estimation. Dependent variable: Ict/Ct-1. N ×T =50 ×10=500. 
  
Transportation 
 
 
Roads 
 (1.a) (1.b) (1.c) (1.d) (1.e) (1.f) 
Ict-1/Ct-2 0,728 
(10,463)*** 
0,720 
(9,965)*** 
0,733 
(9,129)*** 
0,750 
(25,480)***
0,749 
(25,483)*** 
0,725 
(23,717)***
Ist-1/Ct-2 -0,055 
(-2,354)** 
-0,035 
(-2,841)***
-0,042 
(-2,977)*** 
-0,069 
(-1,471) 
-0,066 
(-1,415) 
-0,075 
(-1,975)** 
∆lnYt-1 0,252 
(5,662)*** 
0,201 
(3,844)*** 
0,150 
(2,489)*** 
0,279 
(4,069)*** 
0,251 
(3,487)*** 
0,152 
(2,640)*** 
∆lnNt-1 0,162 
(1,188) 
0,101 
(1,108) 
0,079 
(1,851)* 
0,173 
(1,119) 
0,175 
(1,138) 
0,129 
(2,035)* 
∆ln(Truckst-1/Yt-1) 0,212 
(5,141)*** 
0,184 
(4,054)*** 
0,138 
(2,085)** 
0,224 
(3,357)*** 
0,204 
(2,980)*** 
0,158 
(2,148)** 
∆lnKmt-1 
 
--.-- 0,014 
(1,622) 
0,013 
(1,725) * 
--.-- 0,024 
(1,560) 
0,024 
(1,736)* 
∆lnRailt-1 
 
--.-- 0,067 
(1,540) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
∆lnPortt-1 
 
--.-- 0,002 
(0,438) 
0,002 
(0,472) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
∆lnAirt-1 
 
--.-- 0,016 
(1,985)** 
0,012 
(1,689)* 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
dleft(R)t  --.-- --.-- 0,006 
(1,620) 
--.-- --.-- 0,001 
(1,565) 
dmin(C)t --.-- --.-- 0,002 
(1,520) 
--.-- --.-- 0,003 
(1,770)* 
Vgovt/Vtott 
 
--.-- --.-- 0,006 
(0,789) 
--.-- --.-- 0,056 
(2,246)** 
Margint --.— 
 
--.-- -0,108 
(-2,115)** 
--.— 
 
--.-- -0,135 
(-2,155)** 
R2 0,594 0,598 0,612 0,577 0,590 0,615 
F (ft vs. f) 2,060** 2,056** 2,441** 2,520*** 2,438*** 2,342*** 
F((ηi × ft vs. ft) 0,145 0,104 0,621 0,423 0,510 0,885 
Serial corr.(1st order) -2,845*** -2,758*** -2,550*** -2,002*** -2,984*** -2,995*** 
Serial corr.(2nd order) -0,987 -0,967 -0,990 -0,145 -0,252 -0,341 
Sargan 26,114*** 24,223** 28,463*** 19,019*** 18,001** 22,014*** 
Notes: (1) t statistics in brackets; ***=coefficient significant at the 99%, level **=coefficient 
significant at the 95% level, *=coefficient significant at the 90% level, (2) time effects 
included, (3) Instruments used: lnCt-2, lnCt-3 and lnCt-4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 28
 
Table 3 
Determinants of infrastructure investment, All levels of government, 1987-96.  
GMM estimation. Dependent variable: It/Ct-1. N ×T =50 ×10=500. 
  
Transportation 
 
 
Roads 
 (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) (2.a) (2.b) (2.c) 
It-1/Ct-2 0,771 
(12,921)*** 
0,760 
(12,507)*** 
0,761 
(11,215)*** 
0,785 
(11,020)***
0,787 
(11,084)*** 
0,737 
(10,041)*** 
∆lnYt-1 0,288 
(5,350)*** 
0,214 
(4,051)*** 
0,181 
(2,133)** 
0,502 
(7,026)*** 
0,495 
(6,926)*** 
0,204 
(2,134)** 
∆lnNt-1 0,175 
(1,758)* 
0,075 
(1,920)* 
0,072 
(1,851)* 
0,287 
(1,765)* 
0,299 
(1,727)* 
0,121 
(1,877)* 
∆ln(Truckst-1/Yt-1) 0,225 
(4,629)*** 
0,188 
(3,978)*** 
0,153 
(1,968)*** 
0,442 
(6,703)*** 
0,442 
(6,718)*** 
0,221 
(2,778)*** 
∆lnKmt-1 
 
--.-- 0,016 
(1,814)* 
0,016 
(1,898)* 
--.-- 0,026 
(1,479) 
0,030 
(1,768)* 
∆lnRailt-1 
 
--.-- 0.080 
(1,117) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- --.-- 
∆lnPortt-1 
 
--.-- 0,002 
(0,221) 
0,001 
(0,304) 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
∆lnAirt-1 
 
--.-- 0,026 
(2,812)*** 
0,021 
(2,219)** 
--.-- --.-- --.-- 
∆lnRevt-1 
 
--.-- --.-- 0,002 
(2,396)** 
--.-- --.-- 0,003 
(2,305)** 
∆lnCapt 
 
--.-- --.-- 0,001 
(1,550) 
--.-- --.-- 0,003 
(1,600) 
∆lnDebtt-1 
 
--.-- --.-- -0,005 
(-2,967)*** 
--.-- --.-- -0,002 
(-2,344)*** 
dleft(R)t 
 
--.-- --.-- 0,005 
(1,266) 
--.-- --.-- 0,016 
(1,300) 
dmin(C)t --.-- --.-- 0,001 
(0,345) 
--.-- --.-- -0,001 
(-0,278) 
dmin(R)t 
 
--.-- --.-- -0,002 
(-0,579) 
--.-- --.-- 0,001 
(1,123) 
deyear(R)t 
 
--.-- --.-- 0,002 
(0,548) 
--.-- --.-- 0,001 
(0,231) 
Vgovt/Vtott 
 
--.-- --.-- 0,004 
(1,465) 
--.-- --.-- 0,008 
(1,306) 
Margint --.-- --.-- -0,103 
(-1,683)* 
--.-- --.-- -0,216 
(-2,748)*** 
R2 0,593 0,642 0,667 0,524 0,526 0,573 
F (ft vs. f) 3,940*** 3,710*** 3,589*** 2,885** 2,927** 3,270** 
F((ηi × ft vs. ft) 0,214 0,337 0,961 0,741 0,601 0,636 
Serial corr.(1storder) -2,110*** -2,021*** -2,004*** -2,911*** -2,925*** -2,966*** 
Serial corr.(2ndorder) -0,554 -0,652 -0,492 -0,784 -0,654 -0,581 
Sargan 17,114*** 16,559** 18,240*** 20,001*** 20,0112** 17,004*** 
       Notes: See Table 1 
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Table 4  
Structural parameters of key variables 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                
Notes: (1) z statistics in brackets; ***=coefficient significant at 
the 99%, level **=coefficient significant at the 95% level, 
*=coefficient significant at the 90% level, (2) Only variables 
that appear to be statistically significant in some cases are 
included (3) Political variables are not considered. 
 
 
 Central gov. All levels 
 Transportation 
 ln Y 
 
0.502 
(2.103)*** 
0.731 
(2.003)** 
 ln N 
 
0.295 
(1.790)* 
0.289 
(1.688)* 
 ln(Trucks/Y) 
 
0.517 
(2.003)** 
0.628 
(1.852)* 
 ln Km 0.048 
(1.621) 
0.058 
(1.720)* 
 ln Air 0.012 
(1.667)* 
0.020 
(2.102)** 
 Roads 
 ln Y 
 
0,552 
(2,350)** 
0,775 
(2,211)** 
 ln N 
 
0,469 
(1,855)* 
0,380 
(1,986)** 
  ln(Trucks/Y) 
 
0,574 
(2,054)** 
0,603 
(1,977)** 
 ln Km 0,087 
(1,668)* 
0,075 
(1,691)* 
